Advocates of the Person-Centered Healthcare (PCH) approach say that PCH is a response to a failure of caring for patients as persons. Nevertheless, there are many human subjects falling to fulfill the requirements of a traditional philosophical definition of personhood. Hence, if we take, PCH seriously, a greater clarification of the key terminology of PCH is urgently needed. It seems necessary, for instance, that the concept of the person should be extended in order to include those individuals with insipient or (...) immature levels of consciousness, as well as those who are severely and permanently mentally handicapped. In this article, we will depart from some well-known philosophical concepts of what it means to be a person and try to offer a broader and more inclusive meaning. We suggest that persons are human beings with a socially recognized biography, which implies to recognize as persons individuals with necessities, but also with narratives about their interests and claims, expressed sometimes by other people related to them. This is particularly the case of individuals that suffer from severe disorders of consciousness. For those, is not only care that matters; respect matters too. Caregivers should therefore not only sympathetically care for the well-being of these people; they should also be concerned to respect their interests and claims by interpreting them empathetically, in the light of their biographical story. Our conclusion is that, in order to be coherent, PCH must consider individuals with severe disorders of consciousness as persons and we think that our revised concept of personhood fits with this requirement. (shrink)

In this work, we propose a definition of logical consequence based on the relation between the quantity of information present in a particular set of formulae and a particular formula. As a starting point, we use Shannon‟s quantitative notion of information, founded on the concepts of logarithmic function and probability value. We first consider some of the basic elements of an axiomatic probability theory, and then construct a probabilistic semantics for languages of classical propositional logic. We define the quantity of (...) information for the formulae of these languages and introduce the concept of informational logical consequence, identifying some important results, among them: certain arguments that have traditionally been considered valid, such as modus ponens, are not valid from the informational perspective; the logic underlying informational logical consequence is not classical, and is at the least paraconsistent sensu lato; informational logical consequence is not a Tarskian logical consequence. (shrink)

We are in the information age. Nowadays, the information is a high power commodity. Your domain and handling have high economic, political, social value. However, we still know little about it. What is the information? How do we store it, retrieve it and manipulate it? Everyone have or should have equal access to information? What is the relationship between information and knowledge? How can both influence and be influenced by the action? Can they are modeled? The models can contribute to (...) your understanding? Information and knowledge can consolidate or destroy friendships? What are the most efficient means to produce, store, organize and retrieve knowledge and information? Such questions permeate the content of this book, bringing together Brazilian and foreign authors, seeking to contribute to the improvement of the understanding of each of the concepts involved and the relationships between them. This work is the result of EIICA IX, International Meeting information, knowledge and action, held between December, 2nd and 4th 2015, at the Faculty of Philosophy and Science of UNESP/ Marília. (shrink)

From our perspective, we believe that it is necessary to abandon the idea that all those who suffer from SI or SA are mentally ill, which causes them to be stigmatized and subjected to psychiatric treatment, when what they need is a different vision of life as well as adaptive strategies to employ a new philosophy. Public policies should consider implementing programs that reinforce cognitive flexibility in addition to character strengths.

Abstract: Our soul, as Plato proposed, responds to the nature, functions and interaction of the three parts of which it is composed, without this preventing it from possessing a unitary character. His model of psychism respected the universal perception of the diversity of soul entities, but, by using the tools provided by Greek thought, he turned them into components of a process of opposition and dialectical ascent that reproduced within man the structure of the cosmos. The triangular systems of Aristotle, (...) Kant and Freud are indebted to the power of the Platonic scheme and, at the same time, they have contributed to making the strategy of the tripartite soul one of the fundamental references in philosophy. Key words: tripartite soul, dialectical ascent, unitary character, cosmos, triangular systems. --------------- Resumen: Nuestra alma, propuso Platón, responde a la naturaleza, funciones e interacción de las tres partes de las que se compone, sin que ello impida que, a la vez, posea un carácter unitario. Su modelo de psiquismo respetaba la percepción universal de la diversidad de las entidades anímicas, pero, valiéndose de las herramientas proporcionadas por el pensamiento griego, las convertía en componentes de un proceso de oposición y ascenso dialéctico que reproducía en el interior del hombre la estructura del cosmos. Los sistemas triangulares de Aristóteles, Kant y Freud son deudores de la potencia del esquema platónico y, a la vez, han contribuido a que la estrategia del alma tripartita sea uno de los referentes fundamentales de la filosofía. Palabras clave: alma tripartita, ascenso dialéctico, carácter unitario, cosmos, sistemas triangulares. (shrink)

El constante interés de Freud por la historia ha sido, generalmente, menospreciado. Sin embargo, de la lectura de sus obras se desprende que llegó a elaborar y a manejar una teoría propia, con la que pretendía tener la llave para acceder a los ingredientes capaces de explicar los aspectos fundamentales de la evolución histórica de la humanidad. Sin conocer esta concepción de la historia no puede apreciarse en sus justas dimensiones el edificio teórico freudiano ni valorarse adecuadamente su posición respecto (...) a los límites de la terapia psicoanalítica. (shrink)

El presente ensayo plantea la posibilidad de considerar nuevamente al diseño editorial como una actividad artística. Este campo no pudo escapar al fenómeno de la sociedad del espectáculo que hoy envuelve a casi toda actividad humana. Ello indiscutiblemente afecta la manera en que se valora esta actividad actualmente, vista las más de las veces como un simple aditamento utilitario con más fines comerciales que artísticos. A pesar de ello no deja de ser loable una revaloración de la disciplina que la (...) considere como una producción también transutilitaria, un fenómeno a la vez estético y extraestético y una actividad que, a través de su propia praxis, construye al ser histórico... (shrink)

El Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico afirma que la Lógica es como cualquier otra ciencia. Si esta afirmación es cierta, entonces ella no sólo es revisable, sino que además todo lo que se puede decir sobre las ciencias aplica, mutatis mutandis, para la misma. El propósito de este artículo es explorar esta consecuencia del Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico, acercando a la Filosofía de la Lógica el marco teórico de las Máquinas Nomológicas de Nancy Cartwright. De acuerdo con esta visión, lo que hay de verdadero (...) en las teorías científicas no está en el mundo sino en sus modelos: sistemas altamente controlados, estables, artificiales y específicos, dentro de los cuales se manifiestan regularidades sistematizables y enseñables. Mi afirmación es que lo mismo puede decirse de la Lógica: ella no captura las Leyes del Pensamiento o de la Razón, porque el pensamiento y la razón no están gobernados necesariamente por leyes. Sobre lo que sí puede decirse que versan las Leyes de la Lógica son metafísicas posibles: historias acerca de qué son las proposiciones, el pensamiento, la verdad y la validez. A fin de ilustrar y defender esta tesis, presento un ejemplo de Máquina Nomológica de la Lógica Clásica, basada en una lectura original del Tractatus de Wittgenstein, e investigo algunas de sus consecuencias. Mi conclusión es que esta imagen de la Lógica impacta en el problema de la revisión de la Lógica Clásica, en la medida en que muestra que dicha revisión no necesariamente responde a un proceso racional de adecuación de la teoría a los hechos porque los “hechos” relevantes no son anteriores a la teoría misma, sino que están moldeados y conducidos por ella. Palabras clave: Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico, Abductivismo, Máquinas Nomológicas, Revisión Lógica, Filosofía de la Lógica. (shrink)

Se plantea el problema de la existencia de una campo científico -el geográfico - para el cual existen candidaturas e disciplinas determinadas como la Geografía Física, La Humana, la R egional y la Universal, etc. Se plantea la diferencia entre ciencias naturales y humanas, así como entre ciencias texonómicas y ciencias mereológicas, como marcos de análisis para las ciencias geográficas.

El texto aborda el problema de lo irracional en el pensamiento del filósofo estadounidense Donald Davidson. En consecuencia, representa un estudio de la evolución del conjunto de los artículos académicos publicados por Davidson. Los artículos publicados por Davidson, permiten organizar la evolución de su preocupación por el problema de la racionalidad-irracionalidad. Así, el problema de la racionalidad-irracionalidad encontrará recurrentemente un lugar en el marco más amplio del desarrollo de la obra filosófica de Donald Davison en torno a metafísica, lenguajes, (...) verdad e historia. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se pretende reconstruir la noción de imaginación expuesta por Kant en la "Crítica de la razón pura", en su primera edición, y en la "Crítica del juicio" con el fin de poder dilucidar un posible papel de este concepto en el marco de la ética kantiana. -/- .

Este artigo consiste em abordagem de cunho introdutório sobre a crítica à metafísica. Destacam-se elementos isolados do conteúdo de crítica à metafísica na modernidade e que tende a vir a ser desenvolvido na contemporaneidade. Com isso quer-se dizer que na passagem da modernidade para a contemporaneidade a filosofia acaba por incorporar o conteúdo de crítica à metafísica e evolui na direção de vir a reconhecer sua condição de ser metafísica e de empreender crítica a essa condição. Para estabelecer a abordagem (...) do assunto procura-se aqui manter subjacente a ideia de crítica à metafísica no contexto da história da filosofia; mas é priorizado nisso o aspecto temático em vez de seu aspecto histórico. Busca-se mostrar que no processo de compreender a crítica à metafísica tem ocorrido de se tentar apartar do caráter de metafísico o caráter de teórico da ciência. Requer então indagar se é possível estabelecer marco de separação entre uma coisa e a outra. Em vez de separação opta-se aqui por investir no conhecimento da identidade da própria metafísica como saber filosófico; busca-se esclarecer que a pergunta pelo que é filosofia e a dificuldade de compreender o seu conteúdo é o que traz à tona a crítica à metafísica e a torna necessária, mas como modo de se compreender melhor o que é filosofia. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza, en el marco de la epistemología social aplicada (es decir, desde una perspectiva analítica y normativa) el debate en torno a la confiabilidad de Wikipedia como fuente de conocimiento, proponiendo que es fiable y que, por tanto, debiéramos confiar en ella para adquirir creencias verdaderas. En primer lugar, se analizan las limitaciones y aciertos de las posturas tradicionales acerca de la fiabilidad de Wikipedia, para luego cuestionar el rol epistemológico que ha adquirido la noción (...) de confianza en dicho debate. En segundo lugar, se introduce la noción de “confianza afectiva” propia de la epistemología del testimonio para contrastarla con la “confianza esperanza”, esto con el fin de caracterizar la normatividad social tanto interna como externa que rige y hace fiable a Wikipedia. Finalmente, se resumen los resultados en una serie de razones de orden epistémico para confiar en Wikipedia como fuente de conocimiento como lo son el poseer virtudes en relación con la difusión de información, mecanismos internos y externos que la sustentan, y su supervivencia al colapso del contexto en internet. De este modo, se sugiere que es adecuado, desde el punto de vista epistemológico, emplear con confianza Wikipedia en nuestra vida cotidiana. (shrink)

La Tijāniyya es la ṭarīqa sufí más influyente en África Subsahariana, con casi cien millones de seguidores, y una de las principales del mundo. En estos dos últimos siglos se ha convertido en uno de los movimientos sociales y espirituales islámicos más importantes a nivel mundial. Su presencia desde el Magreb y el Sahel hasta Indonesia o Estados Unidos así lo atestigua. -/- Su conjunción entre un conocimiento gnóstico (ḥaqīqa), otorgado según la tradición por el mismísimo Profeta Muḥammad a Ahmad (...) Tijāni, y un estricto celo al plano legal (sharī‘a) les ha dotado de un gran prestigio social y espiritual en el mundo islámico con enseñanzas que se gradúan desde la aparente simpleza de los primeros pasos del neófito hasta la complejidad de los tratados místicos de los maestros que se recogen en este libro que el lector tiene en sus manos. Un camino, el de revitalizar la tradición del profeta Muḥammad, que marcó de forma muy especial la historia intelectual y política del mundo islámico contemporáneo. -/- Ley y Gnosis explora, por primera vez, la historia de la ṭarīqa Tijāniyya de forma diacrónica. Un estudio que abarca desde su surgimiento en el Magreb hasta su completa globalización en la actualidad haciéndose eco de todas las tendencias e intentando mostrar sus principales doctrinas y autores desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar que combina la Islamología con la Filosofía, la Historia y la Antropología. (shrink)

El artículo explora algunos de los principales rasgos políticos de la época globalizada y defiende la necesidad de entidades políticas representativas que superen el marco del Estado nación. A continuación se pregunta bajo qué presupuestos ético-políticos podría defenderse un modelo político-jurídico global para un mundo axiológicamente diverso y qué concepciones políticas y valores podrían proponerse como referente normativo para una gobernanza global cuya meta habría de ser el ejercicio legítimo del poder. Teniendo en cuenta las dificultades de tal empresa, (...) se presentan posibles estrategias y razones que invitan a considerar que la posibilidad de un acuerdo global no es del todo implausible. (shrink)

El presente escrito tiene por objeto tematizar la colonialidad del ser en el sur-global. Para ello, se identifican, por una parte, las diferencias entre el colonialismo y la colonialidad y, por otro lado, se analiza la emergencia del sintagma colonialidad del ser en el marco de las teorías de la colonialidad, las cuales se sitúan, como punto de partida, en la obra de Aníbal Quijano. La colonialidad del ser consiste en la infravaloración o inferiorización cultural de la vida humana (...) colonizada. La colonialidad del ser enuncia el despojo de la condición humana (des-humanización o sub-humanización) que padecieron los pueblos amerindios colonizados (siglo XVI-XVIII) y que, actualmente, continúan padecido los habitantes que constituyen el sur-global. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza el concepto de ciudadanía y algunas de sus implicaciones en el marco de las democracias occidentales actuales. Partiendo de la premisa de que ser ciudadano supone una determinada relación con un Estado, se revisan algunas de las fundamentaciones clásicas del concepto y se concluye que lo relevante es la variedad de derechos sustantivos que el Estado reconoce a sus sujetos políticos. La esencia de ser ciudadano se desvela revisando el repertorio de derechos a los que (...) su estatuto jurídico permite acceder. Se reflexiona desde ese punto de partida sobre el momento actual, advirtiendo que la pérdida de peso político de los Estados merma derechos ciudadanos y provoca la desafección hacia la política tradicional creando nuevas formas de participación política, cuyos riesgos y virtualidades son destacados. Finalmente, se señala la necesidad de generar estructuras de poder en las que los ciudadanos tengan la posibilidad de ejercer sus derechos políticos y cómo dicha pretensión está ligada al ideal del ciudadano cosmopolita y a instituciones internacionales que den cabida a la diversidad cultural. Se concluye apuntando el papel decisivo que juega la reflexión ética en el reconocimiento de valores mínimos que permitan alcanzar acuerdos que se traduzcan en derechos universalizables. (shrink)

Since 1537 Marco Antonio Zimara’s Tabula cum dilucidationibus in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois has been one of the most efficient and largely used instruments for a swift and at the same time precise access to the philosophical topics discussed in Aristotle’s works and in Averroes’ commentaries as well. In this paper the long and laborious gestation of Zimara’s Tabula is taken into account, starting with the notes in a 1507 edition of Aristotle’s works.

In Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes argues that one cannot trust one’s senses since they are not a reliable source of obtaining knowledge of the world. One of Descartes’s main contentions to support such an argument is from his explanation of dreams, where one can feel one is awake but instead one is dreaming. Native Americans, however, may argue that the experiences one has in dreams are real and are a source of knowledge of the real world. Although Descartes (...) uses dreams to support his argument, some Native Americans have a different take on dreams. Dreams for Native Americans are a source of knowledge as well as a source for obtaining one’s identity. Gregory Cajete, in American Indian Thought, notes that “Dreams and Visions are a natural means for accessing knowledge and establishing relationship to the world. They are encouraged and facilitated.” In other words, it is through dreams that individuals are guided, destined, and informed. Therefore, dreams as understood by some Native Americans are an extension of reality that anticipate events that will happen or can happen. The focus of this paper is an exploration of the philosophical and religious epistemology pertaining to Native Americans as described in their accounts of dreams. (shrink)

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

Argumentation is the gear of a cognitive process of reconstruction when it manifests itself in the discursive proximal space. The cognitive-semiotic perspective of multimodal argumentation suggests that, depending on the knowledge, the codes and signs employed (modes) and the context, certain multimodal structures can lead some audiences towards an accurate mental representation of argumentation, without the need forany formal standardized and verbal structure. We are able to argue with other(s) effectively without the need for a verbal translation of the contents (...) in a space that includes the semiotic interpretation of the message. (shrink)

Esse texto procura explicitar a tese da compreensão atual que Simmel pressupõe como lócus de apreensão e interpretação dos processos humanos dotados de sentido. Para explicitá-la, confronta as posições de Dilthey e Simmel sobre o papel da vivência na fundamentação do conhecimento histórico. Ao contrário de Dilthey, no entanto, Simmel não pressupõe uma vivência que possa ser apreendida em outrem ou circunscrita a partir de um objeto, porque põe o fundamento da compreensão na atualidade daquele que compreende. Assim, opera com (...) possibilidades objetivas da construção de conexões de sentido por meio da projeção de processos psíquicos. Conquanto dificilmente seja lembrado no debate sobre a compreensão ou sobre a filosofia da história, Simmel possui uma posição própria e consistente acerca da fundamentação do conhecimento histórico, que pode ou abrir novos ângulos de pesquisa ou ser fecunda para se reexaminar perspectivas já consolidadas. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...) to believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. (shrink)

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

Résumé : Les domaines de la philosophie et de la théorie politique ont connu un certain nombre de changements au cours des quarante dernières années. L'un attire notre attention tout particulièrement ; le basculement d'un point de vue national, cristallisé par le contrat social rawlsien, vers un point de vue non-national. En effet, plusieurs penseurs abordent un ensemble de phénomènes considérés comme nouveaux, tels que les traités de libre commerce et l'économie globale, les entreprises et les institutions supra et transnationales, (...) l'immigration et les contrôles frontaliers etc. Ces changements sont intéressants puisqu'ils obéissent, principalement, à une évolution majeure du terrain politique et social que l'on appelle mondialisation. Les théoriciens travaillant dans le domaine de la justice globale semblent s'adresser à deux questions différentes mais reliées. La première concerne la justice globale : dans quelle mesure et pourquoi l'ordre mondial est-il juste ou injuste ? Qu'est-ce qu'un ordre global juste ? La deuxième est dans un sens corollaire à la première, et concerne la responsabilité : qui devrait être blâmé ou digne d'éloge pour l'ordre mondial ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables de l'ordre mondial ? Qui devrait redresser ses éventuelles conséquences injustes ? Face à l'économie mondialisée et aux institutions politiques et économiques internationales et trans-nationales, cette interrogation devient légitime et nécessaire : suis-je responsable à l'égard des travailleurs des sweat shop lorsque j'achète des habits à Auchan ou bien à l'égard des caféiculteurs très mal payés lorsque je prends un capuccino dans un café Starbucks ? Est-ce que les citoyens sont responsables des traités de libre commerce que leurs gouvernements signent ? Ces questions sur la responsabilité des individus dans le contexte de la mondialisation seront l'enjeu de ce travail de recherche. Nous interrogerons plus exactement la responsabilité d'un agent lorsqu'il fait partie d'un chaîne causale complexe, lorsqu'il participe d'une injustice structurelle. Ainsi, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une chaîne causale, mais de connexions qui sont l'issue d'un changement des modes de productions, de consommation et de la concurrence dans un marché mondialisé. Plus important encore, il ne s'agit pas simplement de la responsabilité individuelle mais plutôt de la responsabilité individuelle en tant que citoyen, et donc d'une responsabilité politique. Elle peut certes être individuelle, mais nous devons tenir compte du fait qu'elle doit être pensée en tant que responsabilité politique, et pas uniquement morale, puisque l'individu et ses actions sont déterminés par des communautés politiques dans lesquelles il participe, ou dans lesquelles il est représenté. Ainsi, la mondialisation nous invite à repenser la responsabilité individuelle pour pouvoir rendre compte des intuitions morales et politiques qui guident une bonne partie du champ de la justice globale. Pour cela, nous verrons dans un premier temps la manière dont les théories de la justice globale essaient de répondre à ce défit. Grâce à cela nous dégagerons l'hypothèse qui nous guidera, l'idée que dans la mondialisation, un agent peut être responsable, avec d'autres, des raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas considéré comme responsable. C'est-à-dire qu'il sera méta-responsable. Dans un second temps, nous essaierons de déterminer un model de responsabilité individuelle, et de comprendre comment la responsabilité est attribuée. Ensuite, nous essaierons de formuler une manière de concevoir la responsabilité politique. Grâce à ces deux éléments, la responsabilité individuelle et la responsabilité politique, nous pourrons parvenir à formuler une conception de la méta-responsabilité comme forme de penser l'agentivité traversée par la mondialisation. (shrink)

Persuasive technologies can adopt several strategies to change the attitudes and behaviors of their users. In this work I synthesize the lessons learned from three empirical case studies on automated persuasion that have been carried out in the last decade in the contexts of: persuasive news recommendations, social robotics, and e-commerce, respectively. In particular, such studies have assessed, in the technological domain, the effects of nudging techniques relying on well known persuasive argumentation schemas and on framing strategies. In discussing the (...) main findings, I will argue that the obtained persuasive effects are due to the fact that such techniques leverage on cognitive mechanisms that refer to the “system 1” types of automatic processes hypothesized in the context of the dual process theory of reasoning. As a consequence of this state of affairs, any automated persuasive systems (used for ethical purposes: e.g. suggesting good health habits) should be able to re-use these types of system 1 strategies in order to gradually take the users in an argumentation territory where system 2 processes can take place. -/- . (shrink)

This work was my theses to get the MA in Philosophy. Their focus is the ethics implied in digital culture and networked society. Themes are Ethics, culture, technology, political control, autonomous systems.

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

An exploration of panpsychism in Harman's Object-Oriented Ontology.

Background Neuroimaging and lesion studies suggested that the dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices mediate visual metacognitive awareness. The causal evidence provided by non-invasive brain stimulation, however, is inconsistent. -/- Objective/hypothesis Here we revisit a major figure discrimination experiment adding a new Kanizsa figure task trying to resolve whether bilateral continuous theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (cTBS) over these regions affects perceptual metacognition. Specifically, we tested whether subjective visibility ratings and/or metacognitive efficiency are lower when cTBS is applied to these two (...) regions in comparison to an active control region. -/- Methods A within-subjects design including three sessions spaced by one-week intervals was implemented. In each session, every participant was administered bilateral cTBS to either prefrontal, control or parietal cortices. Two concurrent tasks were performed, a real and an illusory figure task, stabilising objective performance with use of an adaptive staircase procedure. -/- Results When performing the replicated task, cTBS was found insufficient to disrupt neither visibility ratings nor metacognitive efficiency. However, with use of Kanizsa style illusory figures, cTBS over the dorsolateral prefrontal, but not over the posterior parietal cortex, was observed to significantly diminish metacognitive efficiency. -/- Conclusion(s) Real and illusory figure tasks demonstrated different cTBS effects. A possible explanation is the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in the creation of expectations, which is necessary for efficient metacognition. Failure to replicate previous findings for the real figure task, however, cannot be said to support, conclusively, the notion that these brain regions have a causal role in metacognitive awareness. This inconsistent finding may result from certain limitations of our study, thereby suggesting the need for yet further investigation. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to introspective awareness or (...) “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...) action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively.1. (shrink)

Consciousness vehicle externalism is the claim that the material machinery of a subject’s phenomenology partially leaks outside a subject’s brain, encompassing bodily and environmental structures. The DEUTS argument is the most prominent argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ arsenal. In a recent series of publications, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein have deployed such an argument to claim that a prominent view of neural processing, namely predictive processing, is fully compatible with CVE. Indeed, in Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s view, a proper understanding of (...) predictive processing mandates CVE. In this essay, we critically examine Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s argument. Our aim is to argue in favor of the following three points. First, that Kirchhoff and Kiverstein’s emphasis on cultural practices lends no support to CVE: at best, it vindicates some form of content externalism about phenomenal content. Secondly, the criteria Kirchhoff and Kiverstein propose to identify a subject’s phenomenal machinery greatly overgeneralize, leaving them open to a “consciousness bloat” objection, which is an analog of the cognitive bloat objection against the extended mind. Lastly, we will argue that the “consciousness bloat” problem is inbuilt in the very argumentative structure of the DEUTS argument. We will thus conclude that, contrary to the philosophical mainstream, DEUTS is not the best argument for CVE in the sensorimotor enactivists’ argumentative arsenal. (shrink)

As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some jurisdictions. By focusing on a prominent type (...) of view of free action, which I call bypassing views, this paper evaluates how such interventions may negatively impact the freedom of their subjects. The paper concludes that there will be a tension between the goals of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism, on the one hand, and the negative impact such interventions may have on free action, on the other. Other things equal, the better that a particular intervention is at achieving the former, the more likely it is to result in the latter. (shrink)

In this work we present NERVOUS, an intelligent recommender system exploiting a probabilistic extension of a Description Logic of typicality to dynamically generate novel contents in AllMusic, a comprehensive and in-depth resource about music, providing data about albums, bands, musicians and songs. The tool can be used for both the generation of novel music genres and styles, described by a set of typical properties characterizing them, and the reclassification of the available songs within such new genres.

In actuarial parlance, the price of an insurance policy is considered fair if customers bearing the same risk are charged the same price. The estimate of this fair amount hinges on the expected value obtained by weighting the different claims by their probability. We argue that, historically, this concept of actuarial fairness originates in an Aristotelian principle of justice in exchange (equality in risk). We will examine how this principle was formalized in the 16th century and shaped in life insurance (...) during the following two hundred years, in two different interpretations. The Domatian account of actuarial fairness relied on subjective uncertainty: An agreement on risk was fair if both parties were equally ignorant about the chances of an uncertain event. The objectivist version grounded any agreement on an objective risk estimate drawn from a mortality table. We will show how the objectivist approach collapsed in the market for life annuities during the 18th century, leaving open the question of why we still speak of actuarial fairness as if it were an objective expected value. (shrink)

We defend, from a contractarian perspective, that the fair price of an insurance policy is the amount that the contracting parties agree when they are both equally uncertain about the insured event. Drawing on the approach developed by R. Sugden in _The Community of Advantage_, we answer two standard objections raised against contractarianism in the actuarial sciences: (1) people are not wise enough to assess their actuarial risks; (2) they are not rational enough to decide which insurance policy suits them (...) better. We show under which circumstances people can make fair actuarial agreements, without presupposing any objective risk or rationality benchmarks. (shrink)

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of (...) a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

The paper presents the heterogeneous proxytypes hypothesis as a cognitively-inspired computational framework able to reconcile, in both natural and artificial systems, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning that have been traditionally seen as incompatible. In particular, through the Dual PECCS system and its evolution, it shows how prototypes, exemplars and theory-theory like conceptual representations can be integrated in a cognitive artificial agent (thus extending its categorization capabilities) and, in addition, can provide useful insights in the context of (...) a computationally grounded science of the mind. (shrink)

This paper presents a practical case study showing how, despite the nowadays limited collaboration between AI and Cognitive Science (CogSci), cognitive research can still have an important role in the development of novel AI technologies. After a brief historical introduction about the reasons of the divorce between AI and CogSci research agendas (happened in the mid’80s of the last century), we try to provide evidence of a renewed collaboration by showing a recent case study on a commonsense reasoning system, built (...) by using insights from cognitive semantics. (shrink)

Dynamic conceptual reframing represents a crucial mechanism employed by humans, and partially by other animal species, to generate novel knowledge used to solve complex goals. In this talk, I will present a reasoning framework for knowledge invention and creative problem solving exploiting TCL: a non-monotonic extension of a Description Logic (DL) of typicality able to combine prototypical (commonsense) descriptions of concepts in a human-like fashion [1]. The proposed approach has been tested both in the task of goal-driven concept invention [2,3] (...) and has additionally applied within the context of serendipity-based recommendation systems [4]. I will present the obtained results, the lessons learned, and the road ahead of this research path. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether it is possible to cause an event by letting it happen.